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OVERCOMING POSNER 
Gerard V. Bradley* 
OVERCOMING LAW. By Richard A. Posner. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press. 1995. Pp. x, 597. $39.95. 
Richard Posner1 aims to "overcome" that "law" that is "a pro-
fessional totem signifying all that is pretentious, uninformed, 
prejudiced, and spurious in the legal tradition" (p. 21). By "legal 
tradition" he mostly means, as the subjects treated in Overcoming 
Law (hereinafter OL) show,2 some recent academic theorizing 
about Law - its nature, substance, purpose - and about some of 
our laws. 
OL contains many previously published but revamped essays, to 
which Posner has added a few new chapters and an introduction.3 
The book is not, however, a "potpourri or an encyclopedia"; it is 
meant to be read "consecutively," as a coherent whole (p. ix). The 
* Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. B.A. 1976, J.D. 1980, Cornell. - Ed. I 
thank Alan Gunn and John Finnis for their comments on drafts of this review. 
1. Richard Posner is Chief Judge of United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit. 
2. Half of the book's chapters are engagements with individual theorists writing today, 
often single leading works. There are chapters on John Hart Ely's Democracy and Distrust 
(chapter 6); Bruce Ackerman's work, including We the People: Foundations (chapter 7); 
Walter Berns's Government by Lawyers and Judges, COMMENTARY, June 1987, at 17 (chapter 
8); Robert Bork's The Tempting of America (chapter 9); Morton Horwitz's two volume study 
The Transformation of American Law (chapter 11); Martha Minow's Making All the Differ-
ence (chapter 12); Drucilla Cornell's, Dialogic Reciprocity and the Critique of Employment at 
Wil~ 10 CARnozo L REV. 1575 (1989) (chapter 13); William Ian Miller's Bloodtaking and 
Peacemaking: Feud, Law, and Society in Saga Iceland (chapter 14); Linda Hirshman's The 
Book of "A," 70 TEXAS L. REv. 971 (1992) (chapter 15); Catharine MacKinnon's Only Words 
(chapter 17); Patricia Williams's The Alchemy of Race and Rights (chapter 18); Ronald 
Coase's works in law and economics (chapter 20); and Richard Rorty's philosophical writings 
(chapter 22). One chapter is devoted to an earlier legal theorist's master work - James 
Fitzjames Stephen's Liberty, Equality, Fraternity (chapter 10). Another chapter responds to 
feminist critics of Posner's earlier book, Sex and Reason (chapter 16). Among the relatively 
few topical chapters are treatments of the "judicial utility curve" (chapter 3), abortion 
(though it is as much about Dworkinian legal theory) (chapter 5), pragmatism in law (chapter 
19), the new institutional economics (chapter 21), legal rhetoric and advocacy (chapter 24), 
blackmail and the Jaw of privacy (chapter 25), and homosexuality (chapter 26). In a separate 
chapter Posner "revisits" his book Law and Literature (chapter 23). There is a chapter on the 
legal profession in Germany and Great Britain, which really constitutes a review of two 
books, one about lawyers in Nazi Germany, the other about detention in WW II Britain 
(chapter4). The remaining two chapters deal with the American legal profession (chapter 1) 
and the legal academy (chapter 2). 
3. The chapters on Patricia Williams, Posner's Law and Literature, blackmail and privacy, 
homosexuality, and legal rhetoric are new. 
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Introduction of the book "contains the fullest articulation to date" 
of Posner's "overall theoretical stance" (p. ix). 
OL is profitably read as an integrated work. It is a sustained 
effort by our most prolific defender of economic analysis of law to 
show that the limitations of that approach - which, Posner con-
cedes in OL, are many and great - can be overcome without 
resorting to philosophy, metaphysics, and ethics - the whole 
"moral" approach to law (Parts II-III) - or without treating law 
and legal reasoning as autonomous disciplines (Parts V-VI). It is in 
philosophy and in legal reasoning that we find the "spurious," the 
"pretentious," the "prejudiced," and the "uninformed" in the legal 
tradition. Posner would welcome a not-distant future in which 
traditional jurisprudence - a meld of the ethical and the legal -
has become irrelevant (pp. 79-80). 
Economics survives this purge. Posner features it in an enter-
prise that he calls "legal theory," "the body of systematic thinking 
about (or bearing closely on) law" (p. vii). Economics is,'he says, 
one of three keys to "legal theory" (p. viii). Posner does not aim to 
disturb existing practices, and OL contains just a handful of con-
crete reform proposals. The "thesis" of OL is that, fused together 
with "liberalism" and "pragmatism,"4 economics can "transform 
legal theory," and presumably, our understanding of Law and laws 
(p. viii). 
I shall argue in this review essay that Posner's roadmap is unreli-
able, that OL takes us on a journey far different from the one 
Posner charts for the reader. My aim is descriptive, diagnostic, and 
analytical - to clarify Posnerian "legal theory" and to trace its 
transformative effects upon our laws. 
I. LIMITATIONS OF THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 
The most arresting feature of OL is Posner's compilation of the 
limitations of economic analysis of law. These concessions are 
neither surprising nor controversial. Most are obvious corollaries 
of recognizing, as Posner must and does, that economic analysis is a 
type of instrumental reasoning. Posner's concessions, numerous 
and grave though they are, fail to convey the true depth and 
breadth of the economic analyst's predicament. Furthermore, and 
oddly, Posner never steps outside the economist's point of view, 
even as he details what the reader will surely regard as the deeply 
immoral implications of a strictly economic approach to law. 
Among the implications of "typical" economic thinking, Posner 
finds "torture and gruesome punishments, enforcing contracts of 
4. On no coherent reading of OL can Posner mean to present either "liberalism" or 
"pragmatism" - or, for that matter, economics - as an ethical system. 
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self-enslavement, permitting gladiatorial contests" (p. 23). Eco-
nomics typically implies "abolishing all welfare programs and other 
forms of social insurance" (p. 23). Economics has no theory of dis-
tributive justice. For example, if beggars are initially assigned the 
right to go door-to-door and solicit money or food, the rich might 
organize and buy them off, effecting a market-generated form of 
welfare. But there is no basis within economics to designate the 
beggars, rather than the begged-from, as the initial assignees of 
rights over begging (p. 23). 
Posner also admits that economics cannot answer the question 
whether we should maximize the wealth of the United States or of 
the entire world (p. 22). The same scope question arises, Posner 
continues, with respect to the treatment of foreigners, animals, the 
profoundly retarded, trees, Jews in a Christian society, and fetuses.5 
This set of questions is about who is to be considered a "member of 
the community" and "therefore a person whose welfare must be 
considered" (p. 190). 
How did economics come to this perilous state? Let us start 
with Posner's basic economics. His economic project imagines that 
individuals base decisions on "the costs to be incurred and the ben-
efits to be reaped from alternative courses of action" (pp. 15-16). 
This assumption - that human beings are intelligent calculators of 
costs and benefits - is essential to economic models of behavior, 
even though the assumption that humans always behave "ration-
ally" is not. "[T]he models hold as useful approximations even 
when the assumption [of rationality] is false" (p. 17). 
The prototypical "economic" choice need not be and often is 
not conscious so "there is no paradox in referring to rational choice 
by animals" (p. 553). Posner does not consider this economics to 
have any proper - i.e., limited, exclusive - subject matter. He 
applies it well beyond familiar economic problems dealing with 
markets and prices.6 
Now, economic reasoning is a type of instrumental reasoning. 
No type of instrumental reasoning can be put to human use without 
some normative choice, or at least without positing some end or 
goal. Economics neither generates nor judges in any noninstru-
mental - e.g., moral - sense the goals and objectives to which it 
might identify the most efficient means. Just as "[n]othing in eco-
5. See pp. 190-91. Posner refers disparagingly to philosophy's inability to distinguish 
computers from talking apes and retarded infants. See p. 191. Some philosophers may have 
that difficulty, although on the whole, the economists seem to be worse off. 
6. This seems to be the substance of Posner's dispute with Ronald Coase. See pp. 406-25. 
Coase would evidently limit economic analysis to conventionally understood market phe-
nomena See p. 415. Posner is famously committed to a wider application of economic rea-
soning to "nonmarket" behavior, such as surrogate motherhood and sexual behavior in 
general. 
May 1996] Overcoming Posner 1901 
nomics prescribes an individual's goals" (p. 16), so too economics 
does not settle social goals. You can ask, and economics will help 
tell you, the most efficient way to produce poisonous gas, as well as 
to build a hospital. Economics will not ask and cannot tell you why 
you should. ' 
The economist, qua economist, cannot proscribe goals or rule 
out a priori any means. Take Posner's own wealth-maximization 
criterion. That goal, along with the techniques of economic analy-
sis, generate certain nonmoral evaluative judgments: this allocation 
of resources is inefficient, that is counterproductive. Posner realizes 
that slavery and child labor, for example, may be the most efficient 
ways to maximize wealth. Mutilating a handful of criminals a year 
probably is a more efficient deterrent than warehousing thousands 
for years. Whether these potentially efficient uses of scarce re-
sources ought to be adopted by persons is a question economics 
does not consider. 
These leading characteristics of economics as a type of instru-
mental reasoning - its incapacity to identify goals and moral indif-
ference to apt means - are what I call economic reasoning's 
"passive vices." They are not minor, and in that sense, passive, 
shortcomings, for they establish the proposition that economic rea-
soning cannot settle what anyone, on any occasion, should, all 
things considered, do. They are passive vices because they do not 
obscure the distinctions that a healthy moral theory needs in order 
to reach an "all things considered" decision. One can imagine this 
economics peacefully coexisting with moral philosophy. In this con-
strual, economics is the great middle part of the public policy story. 
Economics is a useful module, one which needs to be jump-started 
each morning, guided by a pilot who knows the destination and who 
minds the rules of the road. In the "passive" story, economics could 
be - would have to be - complemented and regulated by moral 
philosophy. 
Let us turn to economics' "active vices." An example lays one 
such vice bare. Posner implicitly concedes that the beggar's need is, 
from the economic standpoint, indistinguishable from the surplus of 
the begged-from. The two realities - need and surplus - are, in 
the economic calculus, represented by a single variable - that of 
desires, interests, or "preferences." This commensuration permits 
the calculations that make economic analysis possible. Once the 
need of the beggar and the desire of the rich not to be begged from 
are treated as units along a common metric, moral discrimination 
between them is impossible. Bentham thought beggars should be 
locked up because of the emotional distress that their begging 
caused passersby (p. 23). These "mental externalities" could pro-
vide an economic justification, Posner concedes, for discrimination 
1902 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 94:1898 
agaipst minorities. Economics thus becomes "a potential menace to 
basic liberties" (p. 23). 
Posner illustrates this potential by comparing the distress of 
"conservative[s]" at the thought of people committing homosexual 
acts to the liberty interest homosexuals have in performing such 
acts. Many people, he says, "derive utility from laws to repress ho-
mosexual activity" (p .. 571). Should that "utility be weighed equally 
with the utility" of homosexuals "in deciding whether repressive 
measures are efficient" (p. 571)? Discounting the "utility" of re-
pressing others' conduct would carry Posner "outside the bounda-
ries of economics as they are generally, even generously, 
understood today" (pp. 571-72). He says at one point that it would 
carry him into moral and political philosophy (p. 23). Surely so, but 
note that economics itself gives rise to the dilemma precisely by 
treating very different realities - the choice to engage in sodomy 
and the revulsion felt by those aware of that choice - as "units" of 
the same thing. This is an "active vice" because you cannot think 
your way out of the problem, once economics so sets it up. Practi-
cal reasoning, equipped with blunt and clumsy tools that economics 
affords here, can scarcely do an intelligent job without setting up its 
project differently. 
The "active vices" of economic thinking tend to obscure the dis-
tinctions that practical reasoning needs to guide people to reach the 
right conclusions. Another example is provided by the recent chess 
match between Garry Kasparov and a super computer named 
"Deep Blue." Commentators wondered whether the closeness of 
the match - Kasparov eventually won - indicated that computers 
have "minds" or whether people do not. The question arises pre-
cisely because of the assumption that, since there obviously is some 
kind of "thinking" in no recondite or technical sense, which people 
and machines do about equally well, people and machines - or at 
least their "minds" - are the same. The assumption is unwar-
ranted. There is a lot more to the mind than the type of mathemati-
cal thinking characteristic of chess playing. Only someone flirting 
with reductionist accounts of human reasoning could get worried 
about the chess machine. 
Posner's analytical field is defined by "rationality," in the eco-
nomic sense, wherever it is found. People and beavers are agents, 
in this economic sense. The beaver's dam-construction compares 
favorably as efficient production to anything a precocious infant 
does. Trees are, as far as we can tell, unconscious, but they, like 
people and beavers, are organic substances that "know" what they 
need (water, nutrients) and seek it out (by spreading roots, by turn-
ing to the sun, and so on). The problem begins with identifying a 
particular common capacity - the refined mathematics of chess or 
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other forms of "rationality" as economics conceives it - and treat-
ing such limited rationality as constitutive of agency. Only a ration-
ality wider than the limited rationality in question will notice the 
profound differences between people and computers and between 
babies and beavers. The "boundary question" - as Posner labels 
this class of problems - is not so much a question not answerable 
within economics. Rather, the economic answer - all active beings 
are agents - is deeply untrue to reality, and its practical entail-
ments are morally calamitous. 
Posner describes this problem as "economist[s'] great difficulty 
getting a clear 'fix' on such questions" (p. 22). But economics, as he 
practices it, somehow finds its way of protecting the "autonomy" of 
producers, and of the potentially productive, all Posnerian agents. 
It is "equality," and the goals of distributive justice - assisting the 
more or less unproductive and needy - that are off his radar 
screen. The problem then is not that of a perplexed economics 
humbly seeking rescue from contiguous, humanistic disciplines. It 
is that Posnerian economics supplies bad answers. 
Will economics welcome the help it needs to combat its "active 
vices"? Not according to Posner: 
[T]he use of economics to guide decision in the open areas of law 
ought to be discussable without immersion in the deep waters of polit-
ical and moral philosophy. It is true that some people insist on treat-
ing quite narrow and technical legal questions as microcosms of the 
vastest social issues. They see antitrust cases as raising issues of polit-
ical liberty rather than merely of efficient allocation of resources, con-
tract cases as raising issues of human autonomy rather than merely of 
transaction costs, corporate cases as raising issues of democracy 
rather than issues concerning optimal investment, criminal cases as 
raising deep issues of free will and autonomy rather than the issue of 
how to minimize the social costs of crime. From time to time I shall 
be glancing at efforts to philosophize about such matters. But I think 
the economist can easily hold his own in these debates by showing 
that the most fruitful framework for analyzing this range of legal 
questions is an economic one. [pp. 21-22; footnote omitted] 
The pleading rhetoric - "ought to be discussable"; "most fruitful 
framework" - is a feeble substitute for a frank and robust confron-
tation with the predicament that Posner is in: that economics as he 
envisages it would ignore, and thereafter profoundly threaten, polit-
ical liberty, human autonomy, democracy, and other such ideals. 
It must be emphasized that Posner never judges the various defi-
ciencies of economics - boundary questions, gruesome punish-
ments, and the rest - to be moral defects. . They are not the 
immoral implications of economic thinking. They simply do not, he 
says, correspond to our "intuitions."7 
7. P. 23; see infra Part III. 
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'Il. POSNER'S EVASION OF ANALYTICAL JURISPRUDENCE 
Posner serves up some "normative" analyses in OL.8 He refers 
to such seemingly moral evaluative concepts as "progress" (p. 449) 
and "better" (p. 403). He says that "evaluation" of consequences is 
the terminal point of policy decisions (p. 463). What else could all 
this be, but some distinctly moral framework? Is the Posner of 0 L 
a closet moralist? 
No. Among the important antecedents of OL was some critical 
comment in these pages9 on Posner's article The Jurisprudence of 
Skepticism. 10 As Posner later related the substance of this criti-
cism, 11 he was "taken to task for ignoring the substantial literature 
that treats law as a form of practical reason."12 Steve Burton's 
short but cogent critique forcefully brought to Posner's attention 
the works of H.L.A. Hart, Joseph Raz, and John Finnis. Collec-
tively, their scholarship constitutes the post-war Anglo-American 
analytical legal philosophy that Posner means to argue against in 
OL. These authors treat law and legal reasoning in a way very dif-
ferent from the way Austin, Holmes, and Posner treat them. 
Burton's apt criticism was that Posner had not even considered 
their moralistic approach to law, an approach rendered invisible by 
Posner's "scientific" substitute.13 
8. Posner does not use the tenn "nonnative" in any discernibly consistent sense. Most 
often Posner contrasts it with "positive" and its cousins, "explanatory" and "descriptive." 
Posner says that judges act "nonnatively" whenever they decide a case which cannot be de-
cided "by reference to precedent or some clear statutory text." P. 21. Posner appears to 
mean that in such cases judges make rather than follow law. See p. 235. But Posner leaves no 
room for moral reasoning in this "nonnative" enterprise. He says elsewhere that 
"[e]conomics has value in the nonnative as well as the positive analysis of sex." P. 569. This 
is consistent with the view that economic analysis is commonly an aid to lawmaking. 
Occasionally, Posner develops what he simply calls "nonnative" analyses, and sometimes 
he calls for economic "evaluation" of consequences. See p. 571. 1\vo leading examples are 
Posner's treatment of AIDS policy and of the military ban on homosexuals. See pp. 561, 569-
71. On AIDS policy he makes a forthright recommendation, but only by assuming a detenni-
nable goal - reduction of AIDS - and asking whether criminalizing sodomy is a "realistic" 
means of reaching that goal. Seep. 561. On the issue of homosexuals in the military, Posner 
concedes that economics fails to provide a clear prescription. See p. 571. 
Posner also laments the "relentlessly nonnative" quality of contemporary constitutional 
theory, which he identifies with worrying about the "legitimacy" of leading "individual 
rights" decisions. P. 171. He disputes the "nonnative" adequacy of Bruce Ackennan's con· 
stitutional theory, apparently equating normativity here with "legitimacy." P. 219. 
Posner ordinarily describes "economic theory" as "non-nonnative" and "positive." P. 
427. But he also speaks of "economic theory, with all its nonnative as well as positive bag· 
gage," and of the "nonnative" theory of antitrust which conforms to the dictates of wealth 
maximization. P. 173. 
9. See Steven J. Burton, Judge Posner's Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 81 MICH. L. REV. 710 
(1988). 
10. Richard A. Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 827 (1988). 
11. RICHARD A. PosNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 72 n.3 (1990) [hereinafter 
POJ]. 
12. Id. at 72. 
13. Burton, supra note 9, at 717-18. 
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Posner mentioned Burton's criticism in Problems of Jurispru-
dence, (hereinafter POI) but referred readers to a book that Posner 
- incorrectly, in my view - recommended as "illustrat[ive]" of the 
approach Burton recommended.14 Posner confessed, in any event: 
"I am unable to find the content in this literature."15 Readers' of 
14. POJ, supra note 11, at 72 n.3 (citing ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF LEGAL ARGU-
MENTATION (1989)). 
15. Id. at 72. That Posner had a very poor grasp of what the literature says is evidenced 
by, among many other signals in POJ, his assertion that Finnis is an intuitionist operating on 
Holmesian "can't helps." Id. at 352. The whole basis for Finnis's work is the contention that 
first practical principles, though self-evident to those who attend without obscuring precon-
ceptions to the relevant data, are not intuitions - insights without data. Posner misunder-
stands what Hart, Raz, and Finnis mean by "practical." He says, in reference to this 
literature, that "practical" reason is in "contrast to the methods of 'pure reason' by which we 
determine whether a proposition is true or false, an argument valid or invalid." Id. at 71. 
This is certainly not what Hart, Raz, and Finnis have in mind. "Practical reason" is reasoning 
(pure, if you like) about what to do. This includes, but is much more than, the logical coher-
ence that Posner seems mainly to mean by "pure reason." "Practical reasoning" is to be 
distinguished from "theoretical," or "speculative," reasoning (again, "pure" if you like) about 
what is, not what is to be brought about by human action. This distinction was clear from 
Burton's brief critique. It is the presupposition of Hume's naturalistic fallacy: that no 
"ought" conclusion validly can be drawn (ram a string of "is" premises. 
Posner takes up in POJ Hume's dictum, and he rejects the "extreme skepticism" he thinks 
it entails. Id. at 352. Posner obviously thinks that if Hume is right, one has no alternative but 
skepticism. Not so. Finnis, for a notal:!le example, agrees that one cannot deduce an "ought" 
from a string of "is" premises. But Fmnis is no skeptic. If Hume is right (and he is), it simply 
means that moral truths are not valid (are not truths) due to their correspondence with what 
is. 
Posner also seems to believe that the naturalistic fallacy makes what he calls "moral ob-
jectivity" impossible. The "problem of moral objectivity is that there are neither facts to 
which moral principles correspond (as scientific principles appear to correspond to things in 
nature) nor a strong tendency for moral principles to converge." Id. at 236. He makes a 
similar point in OL. Seep. 449. But moral principles are not true because they correspond to 
things already out there now in nature. What Posner means by "converge," and why it is the 
consummate evidence of objectivity is not explained. In any event, Posner seems to believe 
that any putative moral norm worth considering must be either a command of nature or as 
certain and as objective as technical calculations are. 
Posner makes strange attempts to show a fallacy in the "naturalistic fallacy" argument: "if 
a watch is not working, it ought to be fixed," and a "police officer should not sleep on duty." 
POJ, supra note 11, at 352. But his attempts fail, for here we have either a moral "ought" 
smuggled into our premises (i.e., police officers are persons for whom it would be wrong to 
sleep on duty) or in the watch case a distinctly nonmoral evaluative (i.e., functional) ought. 
Posner seems to think that moral "objectivity" is possible only if moral decisions can be 
reduced to technical questions. This assumed criterion of moral objectivity obscures Posner's 
vision. He refers to "Sartre's imaginary 'Pierre,' who must decide whether to join the Resist-
ance or take care of his aged mother." P. 451. Pierre's "dilemma" represents to Posner a 
"radical indeterminacy" in morals, common in law, for "whichever way Pierre chooses he 
may never know whether he chose right." P. 451. Why cannot it be that, either way, Pierre 
chooses correctly? Why is the reality of two or more incompatible, morally upright courses 
of action a cause of despair? Is it not rather the essential precondition for free choice? The 
"dilemma" here is that there is great emotional difficulty associated with leaving unattended 
certain options, but is that not commonly the case? Couples who marry and choose to have 
children are obviously choosing something worthwhile, just as they realize that the commit-
ment that marriage and parenting entails will require them to forego many other worthwhile 
pursuits - hobbies, career opportunities, friendships, and so on. When we focus on the 
foregone opportunities there is a certain wistfulness, but that does not make for a moral 
dilemma. 
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OL will learn even less about that philosophical alternative than did 
readers of POI. Finnis appears nowhere in 0 L. Raz appears once 
(p. 465) in a laundry list of academics. Hart appears inconsequen-
tially as party to the Hart-Devlin debate (p. 262) and in a footnote 
to Posner's treatment of the judicial utility function (p. 132 n.42). 
Posner refers readers of OL to his prior treatment of natural law 
and positivism in POJ. There he described "natural law" as "basic 
political morality."16 But this is inaccurate. "Natural law" is, on all 
accounts, about rectitude in all human choosing, including (not pri-
marily) choice by persons exercising public authority. "Natural 
law," in other words, is a moral system and not a mere doctrine 
about law or politics. 
Posner is sensitive to the criticism that his account of law is re-
ductionist (p. 15). But he misunderstands the criticism. Burton was 
saying that Posner's legal theory leaves no room for unrestricted 
practical reasoning that is all instrumental - technical, scientific -
reasoning. Posner thinks that Burton's charge was that Posner's 
particular - i.e., economic - type of instrumental reasoning is too 
narrow. Economics, according to Posner, "far from being reduc-
tionist," is "the instrumental science par excellence" (pp. 15-16). 
Posner admits that instrumental rationality may not be the only ten-
able conception of rationality (p. 553 n.2), but where one would 
expect some reference to the classical tradition of practical reason-
ing - a reference, say, to able contemporary natural theorists like 
Finnis and Robert George - Posner refers the reader to a chapter 
of Robert Nozick's The Nature of Rationality.11 What Posner 
means to recommend in that difficult chapter is not stated, nor is it 
clear upon reading Nozick. Nozick does not, in any event, defend 
anything like the perspective that Burton tried to bring to Posner's 
attention. 
In the climactic moment of OL, Posner concedes that his "epis-
temological defense" of liberalism - in sum, his essentially amoral 
analytical framework - has been criticized "by philosophical real-
ists and Catholics, among others."18 The realist view holds that 
16. See POJ, supra note 11, at 230. 
17. Seep. 553 n.2 (citing ROBERT NOZICK, THE NATURE OF RATIONAUI'Y ch. 5 (1993)). 
18. P. 451. Of course, Catholics are philosophical realists; at least a realist epistemology 
is necessary to sustain the Church's teaching, emphasized often by Pope John Paul II, that 
there are universally binding exceptionless moral norms. 
The most troubling aspect of OL is Posner's recurring caricaturization of the Catholic 
Church when he should be engaging in counterarguments. Even so, Posner nowhere cites, 
much less explains, a single Church document, even in the area of sexual morality. He no-
where cites Finnis, a Catholic who is arguably the world's leading legal philosopher. Posner 
recommends to readers Ronald Dworkin's discussion of religious views on abortion, a por-
tion of Life's Dominion that is largely about Roman Catholic teachings. See p. 188 n.38. 
Unfortunately, this part of Life's Dominion is so completely inaccurate that only someone 
with the slimmest familiarity with Church teaching could recommend it. See Gerard V. 
Bradley, Life's Dominion: A Review Essay, 69 N.D. L. REv. 329 (1993). Dworkin's ideologi-
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"there are objective truths about science, morality, politics, and law, 
which we can find by the light of reason" (p. 451). Posner responds: 
"I shall not try to discuss" this view, because "it belongs to the do-
main of indeterminate high theory" (p. 451). Posner distinguishes 
and unconvincingly refutes a criticism by Alasdair Macintyre, a 
learned and critical philosopher who eventually became a Catholic 
and has identified himself most conspicuously with Thomism. 
Posner does not mention any of the vast Mclntyrian corpus, save a 
little-known one-page fragment (p. 451). 
Posner early in OL gives readers the impression that his pro-
ject's success hinges upon a stable resolution of the boundary ques-
tion.19 Now he says that "the idea of the self ... the 'real me,' is 
itself a construct" (p. 534). He continues: "I shall not try to solve 
the mystery of who this 'we' is who 'constructs' our various public 
selves" (p. 535). Posner's pragmatic counsel on the issue of abor-
tion is: muddle through it.20 Of Dworkin's "law as integrity," 
cal explanation of Church teaching that abortion is always wrong - basically it is a rhetorical 
instrument wielded by the clerical ruling class - is congenial to Posner. 
Posner says in 0 L that "traditional preoccupations" of jurisprudence will be "increasingly 
irrelevant." P. 79. Those still so preoccupied resemble "medieval canonists" engaged in 
"hermetic discourse" that befits "a profession that seeks to justify its privileges by pointing to 
the high obscurity of its thoughts." P. 80. Posner elsewhere compares lawyers' intellectual-
ization of their activity to 
the relation between clerisy and laity in the medieval Church. Like many clerics, profes-
sionals practice "unworthy arts to raise their importance among the ignorant," including 
"an affectation of mystery in all their writings and conversations relating to their profes-
sion • • . and a demeanor solemn, contemptuous and highly expressive of self-
sufficiency." 
P. 58 (quoting JEFFREY LIONEL BERLANT, PROFESSION AND MONOPOLY: A STUDY OF 
MEDICINE IN THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN 89 (1975)). 
Posner squarely invites the reader to choose between religion - with which he has identi-
fied much of the "moralistic" rival he should be arguing against - and reality: 
When Cardinal Bellarmine refused to look through Galileo's telescope at the moons of 
Jupiter, whose existence seemed to refute the orthodox view that the planets were fixed 
to the surface of crystalline spheres, he was not being irrational. He was just refusing to 
play the science game, in which theories are required to conform to observations, to "the 
facts," rather than the other way around. Bellarmine's game was faith. It is a common 
game in our society as well, taking many forms, the cosmological one being astrology. 
Another game of faith today is "political correctness." If you show a player in that game 
a sheaf of scientific reports purporting to show that the races or the sexes differ in their 
potential for doing mathematics, the player will refuse to read them; the empirical inves-
tigation of racial and sexual differences is rejected in that game, just as the empirical 
investigation of planetary motion was rejected by Bellarmine. 
P. 7. Posner is grotesquely wrong on the facts here. Bellarmine, a leading theologian of the 
day, was on friendly terms with Galileo. Bellarmine accepted Galileo's invitation to look 
through the telescope in April of 1611, and thanked Galileo for the opportunity. There was, 
twenty-three years later, a sharp, regrettable, and on both sides unnecessary disagreement 
between the Church and Galileo. See E. McMullin, Bellarmine, Robert, in DICTIONARY OF 
SCIENTIFIC BIOGRAPHY 587 (C. Gillispie ed., 1970). But it was not part of a "faith game," 
swinging free from observable reality, as Posner implies. Has Posner ever wondered why 
science has thrived in the Christian West? Or considered how Galileo, who lived and died a 
Catholic, came to be such a great scientist? 
19. See supra text accompanying note 5. 
20. Seep. 404. Posner may think that the positive law - specifically, the first sentence of 
the Fourteenth Amendment - confines the effects of this uncertainty to unborn children. If 
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Posner dismissively remarks: "I get nothing out of such high-falu-
tin' prose" (p. 403). 
Posner states clearly his "prediction," which he devoutly wishes 
to come to pass, that "traditional jurisprudence" will become irrele-
vant (p. 79). He believes, it seems to me, that entirely material de-
velopments - in the law market, computer technology, 
accountancy, engineering - will displace the moralistic approach 
to law. Posner evidently hopes and trusts that information - re-
fined and organized, to be sure - about stuff, including people, will 
make morality obsolete (see pp. 79-80). 
The "active vices" of economic reasoning have had their way. 
Remember that the "passive" story, which Posner can easily be 
heard to recite, especially in the Introduction, imagines some non-
economic determination of ends and ethically suitable means, mat-
ters upon which economics confesses its incompetence. The 
"boundary questions" seemed to be raised in this context. 
Consider, now, what Posner says about "muddling through" 
abortion. He still says that the "economic approach" cannot an-
swer the question whether abortion should be restricted; pragma-
tism is brought in to round out the approach (p. 404). Pragmatism, 
however, does not answer the question any more than economics 
does. Pragmatism, in Posner's hands, simply asserts that abortion is 
an area "where a lack of common ends precludes rational resolu-
tion" (p. 404). Pragmatism's counsel is simply to wait - "until a 
consensus of sort based on experience with a variety of approaches 
to abortion emerged" (p. 405). We have heard Posner say that eco-
nomic - i.e., rational - analysis needs posited ends to get going, 
and we thought he would deploy "pragmatism" and "liberalism" to 
generate those ends. But Posner's pragmatism, if not liberalism, 
does not generate ends and goals either. Posnerian pragmatism 
seems now to serve the outcomes generated by economics. 
It's time to consider these curious aides to economics: pragma-
tism and liberalism. 
Ill. LIBERALISM AND PRAGMATISM 
Let us start with liberalism. Posner is pretty clear about what it 
comprises: the "neutrality principle" - the liberal state is "neutral 
about substantive values"21 - and the "harm principle" - the state 
so, he is quite mistaken. The Amendment, it may be assumed, guarantees some rights but 
only to "persons born and naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added). Obviously, without some stable 
account of "personhood," newborns and others with various deficiencies may be character-
ized as "subpersonal" beings, the results of failed attempts at genuinely personal 
reproduction. 
21. Seep. 449. This is very hard to square with most of the rest of what Posner says about 
constitutional judging. See pp. 171-255. According to Posner, in the end a judge must decide 
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may justifiably curtail liberty only to prevent palpable "harms" to 
third parties (pp. 23-24). Posner does not say that these two ele-
ments of liberalism are implied or entailed by our positive law; he 
thinks much of our law is paternalistic - that is, illiberal (p. 25). 
Posner says in one place that he is simply taking his "stand" here on 
"issues of political and moral philosophy" (p. 23). More in har-
mony with the central tenets of OL, he says that our "liberal intu-
itions" are strong. We cannot be talked out of them.22 Standard 
liberal types - explorer, maker, free-thinker, scientist - "are 
types I [Posner] like," though he quickly adds that "[t]his ideal has 
no "solid grounding in pragmatism or anything else" (p. 29). 
Posner clings to the harm principle of "classical liberalism" -
"whether rightly or wrongly" (p. 24). 
This is the language of distinctly nonmoral "can't helps." We 
find ourselves holding the "neutrality" and "harm" principle - ex-
cept that Posner allows that "we" are erratic liberals, for we cling to 
a number of paternalistic policies. There is no anterior set of moral 
principles from which liberalism is derived, nor within which we 
might develop and apply these "intuitions." So, Posner offers no 
argument directly for our liberalism. He, submits that none is 
needed: "[U]ngroundedness is characteristic of many of our mostly 
firmly held norms (p. 190). "We reason from our bedrock beliefs" 
- against slavery and infanticide - "not to them" (p. 191). 
Is there anything that warrants our liberalism? Posner holds 
that by liberalism's consequences we shall know its value. It is very 
successful in practice. He says that the "strongest states" - Britain 
in the nineteenth century, the United States in the twentieth -
have been "liberal" (pp. 24-25). Well, the Third Reich, decidedly 
illiberal, gave the allies a pretty good contest in the Second World 
War. A hardly liberal Japan gave the United States a run for its 
money in World War II, and a still illiberal Japanese society is very 
productive economically. Besides, the liberalism that Posner aims 
to def end so pragmatically - consisting of the neutrality and harm 
principles - has only partially been realized in the United States, 
beginning only in the late 1960s. Victorian Britain hardly sub-
scribed to liberal tenets, as James Fitzjames Stephen eloquently 
testified. 
open cases on instinct, not analysis, on the basis of his or her own values that, like everyone 
else's, are "can't helps." P. 192. Posner means to rule out of public decisionmaking "compre-
hensive doctrines," and he does so by supposing that we, including judges among us, hold 
"bedrock" convictions without supporting theories. But treating value judgments as "can't 
helps" does not save them from nonneutrality, even if one holds that "imposing" them is 
somehow inevitable. The exercise becomes the entirely nonneutral one of imposing values 
one cannot rationally defend. 
22. "There is no intellectual procedure that will or should force us to abandon them." P. 
23. 
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Posner claims that the twentieth century "is rich with evidence 
that communal alternatives to liberalism, whether fascist or socialis-
tic, are monstrous, nonviable, or both" (p. 27). Here is a criterion 
different from raw intuition. I agree that "fascistic and socialistic" 
alternatives are not preferable to liberalism, but that hardly ex-
hausts the alternatives. Besides I would defend that judgment ethi-
cally; Posner cannot do so. Posner says he will defend liberalism 
"pragmatically" by comparing its consequences with consequences 
of such alternatives as "social democracy and moral conservatism" 
(p. 29). But he relies on the flimsiest anecdotal evidence, and the 
anecdotes are not even true. 
Posner asserts that "liberalism creates the conditions that expe-
rience teaches are necessary for personal liberty and economic 
prosperity" (p. 24). He has in mind spheres of privacy and free 
markets: "Liberalism fosters the exchanges of information that are 
necessary to scientific and technological progress, enlists uncoerced 
citizen support, maximizes productive output, encourages and re-
wards competence, prevents excessive centralization of decision-
making, weakens competing loyalties to family or clan, and defuses 
sectarian strife" (p. 25). 
Maybe, up to a point, but it seemed that Posner intended liber-
alism to alleviate the deficiencies of a strictly economic legal theory. 
Posner concedes now that liberalism "is no more successful than 
economics in dealing with boundary issues" (p. 27); it is "not a com-
plete philosophy of government and law"; and it is "in tension with 
democracy" (p. 25). Posner's liberalism heads off the chaos pro-
duced by the economists' mental externalities only by bald stipula-
tion. Where is the needed supplement or corrective to economic 
reasoning? Does Posner's pragmatism, if not his liberalism, provide 
a solid grounding for identifying who or what is part of the commu-
nity - for prohibiting slavery, infanticide, gruesome punishment? 
Posner is anxious to distinguish his brand of pragmatism from 
the leading post-modernist brand - what he calls "the excess of 
pragmatism" (p. 317). Post-modernists like Richard Rorty and 
Stanley Fish are "not merely antimetaphysical, which is fine, but 
also antitheoretical" (p. 317). Posner is certainly not inclined to the 
dreamy, glib, leftist political rhetoric of Rorty. Though resolutely 
antimetaphysical, Posner does not question external reality as such. 
Posner is no solipsist. 
Posner's pragmatism is distinctly a via negativa. It "is not in the 
business of supplying foundations" (p. 29). It is conceived to en-
gender doubt about "foundations," and is "especially dubious" that 
"analytic philosophy [or] legal reasoning can be used to establish 
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moral duties or legal rights."23 The pragmatist is "suspicio[us] of 
propositions" not provable by scientific methods - like the max-
ims of common sense and "the claims of metaphysics and theol-
ogy. "24 Posner's pragmatists are hard-headed scientific types. They 
do not ground claims about things as ethereal as the propositions 
that it is always wrong to kill infants and that slavery is wrong re-
gardless of its efficiency .. Pragmatism, it seems, is what we call not 
worrying about the limits of economic analysis. 
Posner's "pragmatic jurisprudence" "plants no trees" but clears 
away "underbrush" (p. 405). It "signals an attitude, an orientation, 
at times a change of direction" (p. 405). The pragmatist is anti-
dogmatic, anti-metaphysical, and skeptical about "truth with a capi-
tal T," but "respect[s] those lower case truths we call facts" (p. 377). 
The pragmatist is well-informed, open-minded, empirical, forward-
looking, practical, experimental. Pragmatism connotes a determi-
nation to "use law as an instrument for social ends" (p. 405; empha-
sis added). Evidently, we cannot resolve to evaluate pragmatism by 
its consequences. We are pragmatists when we evaluate other 
things - like liberalism - by their consequences, and not by their 
truth. 
Posner specifically addresses the relation between pragmatism 
and economics - "the most highly developed instrumental concept 
of law" (p. 403) - particularly in light of the criticism that the lat-
ter's defenders have failed to ground it in some ethical tradition. 
The criticism is that economics needs an enveloping ethical theory 
to humanize it. Posner responds: "The criticism is sound as obser-
vation but not as criticism" (p. 403). He adds: "Pragmatists are 
unperturbed by a lack of foundations" (p. 403). Posner identifies 
the observation as the idea that law should maximize wealth (p. 
403). He says that the relevant ground for criticism is whether an 
23. P. 9. I can only suppose that Posner means moral bases for legal rights, since he does 
not seem to question that legal texts - the United States Code or the Constitution - estab-
lish some legal rights. 
24. P. 9. Posner seems to think all metaphysics is a matter of faith-based statements 
about very elusive realities, if metaphysics refers to any real thing at all. Not so. The central 
plot device of the movie Toy Story is metaphysical. When Buzz Lightyear first appears 
among Woody the Cowboy, Mr. Potato Head, Bo-Peep, and the other toys in Andy's bed-
room, his speech and demeanor mark him as somehow different. At first he seems just a bit 
more earnest than the others, slightly out-of-place, like the kid who studies during recess. It 
is soon apparent that the problem is in his self-understanding. Just before the characters 
deliver lines that identify the precise anomaly, the eight-year old metaphysician next to me at 
the theater blurted it out: "He doesn't know he's a toy!" Buzz Lightyear thought he was 
really a space ranger. The rest of the movie is about Buzz coming to grips with the reality 
that he is not a Space Ranger, or any other person. He is really just a toy. Toys are not 
persons. · 
The "reallys" signify elements in a deep structure common to things that can be studied 
but not altered by human thought. This is metaphysics, which takes its name from the pro-
saic reality that Aristotle's book after The Physics was about such things. Aristotle did not 
give it a title. We call it The Metaphysics - meaning after Physics. 
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economics of wealth-maximization is the "best" approach for the 
American legal system to follow (pp. 403-04). Just so, but we are 
trying to settle what it here means to say "best." Posner means that 
it "fits" us, just where we are at, but economics, he seems to con-
cede, does not fit us. Pragmatism sounds like a way of saying that 
that deficiency no longer troubles us, or at least not Posner. 
Posner's pragmatism, I submit, expresses the implications of 
economic analysis of law, and very, very little else. There is abso-
lutely nothing in Posner's pragmatism that impedes - in the slight-
est - the unfolding of whatever "normative" conclusions emerge 
from economic analysis of law. The pragmatist is interested in the 
consequences - palpable, real, testable, observable consequences 
- of legal reform proposals (p. 290). So, too, the economist: "Ec-
onomics imagines the individual not as 'economic man,' but as - a 
pragmatist" (p. 16). Law and economics, according to Posner, 
"epitomizes the operation in law of the ethic of scientific inquiry, 
pragmatically understood" (p. 15). He is convinced that "[m]odern 
economics can furnish the indispensable theoretical framework for 
the empirical research that law so badly needs" (p. 19). 
Now, when we hear Posner saying that "[t]he economic ap-
proach cannot be the whole content of legal pragmatism" (p. 404), 
we hear an emphasis upon "whole." When economic analysis is un-
suitable, pragmatism serves to prevent recourse to noneconomic 
thought, even if just to criticize the implications of economics. 
Pragmatism does not supplement economic reasoning. It is not the 
hero of the "passive" story. Pragmatism instead cuts off would-be 
rescuers, like moral philosophy, at the pass. Pragmatism is the bod-
yguard of economics, protecting its autonomy against harm from 
competing practical visions. 
IV. POSNER'S "CAN'T HELPS" 
My hypothesis is that "liberalism" and "pragmatism" are 
dummy outfits fronting for economics. If that is true, it would seem 
that OL is self-refuting, for Posner seemed to allow in his Introduc-
tion that economics alone is inadequate, and even disastrous. Let 
us test my hypothesis a bit. 
Pragmatists do not deny that slavery is wrong. Posner the prag-
matist does not say: "Let us have slavery!" The pragmatist would 
"disconnect[] the whirring machinery of philosophical abstraction 
from the practical business of governing our lives and societies" (p. 
463). Pragmatism does not upset the practices that appear to rest 
on the now-shaken foundations but aims to show that their "validity 
depends on the evaluation of their consequences" (p. 463). But this 
is viciously or vacuously circular. The "practice" that rests on the 
foundationless conviction that slavery is wrong is the prohibition of 
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slavery. Is that consequence a thing of value? I think so, and would 
argue for it. Posner seems to think so, but would not argue for it. 
Moral reasoning and the conclusions people reach on the basis 
of it pop up in OL as "facts" about people's attitudes, much like 
"mental externalities." Some practices "revolt us." Posner remarks 
that "[ o ]ur primary motives for not killing children are indeed bio-
logical and sentimental" (p. 191 ). The pragmatist does not enter 
into the moral discourse of ordinary citizen's deliberations about 
abortion or slavery or infanticide. Posner tersely says: "The state-
ment that it is wrong to torture children ... is merely a descriptive 
statement about our morality, not a normative statement" (p. 36). 
Posner appropriates - "gets a fix" on - what we hold to be 
morally true by assimilating those truths to economics. But his 
translation of moral truths into pragmatically conceived "facts" dra-
matically alters the entity_ translated. The move is a simple factual 
mistake - we do reason to conclusions like, "slavery is wrong." 
The move is also intrinsically naive and empirically unavailable. 
Posner thinks we can go from counting just so many "revulsions" to 
a social consensus that, say, "slavery is wrong." We cannot. Let me 
explain. 
If "we" are agreed not to have "slavery," slavery cannot be just 
the name of something we abhor. How would "we" know that 
"we" are referring to the same thing when we find ourselves simul-
taneously abhorring something? Ralph abhors broccoli, Billy might 
abhor politicians, Jane might abhor how women are treated within 
the family, and Mary might abhor Barney the dinosaur. Even if 
they express this feeling at about the same time, there is no consen-
sus. If they all shout "yes" at the same time, they still have not 
approved or agreed to anything, unless there is a proposition identi-
fiable as that to which "yes" is their response. 
Posner supposes that "we" refer to the same t~g as "slavery." 
So, slavery is a proposition or at least a definite something. What is 
it? The "slavery" "we" condemn is, presumably, not merely a prac-
tice in which people work on cotton farms, or where people of dark 
complexion work for light-skinned people, or a system of outdoor 
work below the Mason-Dixon line. These were features of the "his-
tory of Negro slavery" that Posner says makes people very upset (p. 
305), but they are all accidental features of that "slavery" that we 
condemn. Posner soundly remarks that legal analysis runs amok 
when it treats "slavery" promiscuously as a metaphor (p. 212), using 
it to condemn situations like anti-abortion laws, which are, Posner 
says, significantly different. He says that this confuses the essence 
of a thing and its attributes. It may. But he has veered to the other 
extreme, into a strict nominalism that is itself incapable of a stable 
account of "essence" and "accident." 
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'When people say "slavery is wrong," they have a description of 
"slavery" in mind. The essential or defining feature is, I submit, its 
morally decisive aspect or aspects. Is it, as the abolitionists alleged, 
interference with slaves' freedom of conscience? Does slavery vio-
late principles of just labor relations?25 Is slavery wrong because it 
treats persons as property, as commodities? If so, we now have a 
good reason to reject any other public policy that possesses the 
same characteristic. The answer to this question will be, I submit, a 
distinguishing immorality of slavery. 
"Slavery" just cannot be distinguished as a something about 
which we might hold evaluative views on Posner's account of 
morals. The sterility of Posner's account is most apparent in his 
comments on self-enslavement, which, as he implicitly concedes, ec-
onomics suggests should be legal (p. 23). He reduces "slavery" to a 
"name" we give to some phenomenon "that we abhor," but not to 
"outwardly rather similar things" like joining the army, becoming a 
Catholic priest, or being sentenced to prison (p. 304). Well, why is 
not the priesthood prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment? Pos-
ner says - can only say - that it is a form of "involuntary servi-
tude" we happen not to abhor (p. 304). The question remains, how 
do we distinguish it from the disapproved kind? 
Posner is entangled in his own web when discussing Griswold v. 
Connecticut. 26 He calls Griswold the "first of the sexual liberty 
cases" (p. 186). He attributes this "national embarrassment" of a 
case to the "sectarian" pressure of a single interest group - the 
Catholic Church.27 He grounds his rejection of the Connecticut law 
not in any theory of constitutional interpretation, but in "instinct," 
an "imperative felt need for intervention" (p. 192). 'What triggered 
the feeling? He asserts that the only practical effect of the law was 
to deprive lower-class women of effective birth control (p. 204). Is 
this the feeling-triggering effect? But feelings, unlike propositions 
and supporting arguments, are essentially private and 
incommunicable. 
Is Griswold authority for invalidating all "embarrassing" laws? 
Posner says the law invalidated in Griswold was an "embarrass-
ment" just like the embarrassment of 
a law forbidding remarriage, or limiting the number of children a mar-
ried couple may have, or requiring the sterilization of persons having 
genetic defects, or denying the mothers of illegitimate children paren-
25. Some anti-abolitionists claimed that slaves were treated better by their masters than 
northern wage laborers were treated by the captains of industry. 
26. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
27. See pp. 193-94. Of course, the Catholic Church, neither in 1965 nor now, holds that 
its teaching on contraception is "sectarian." The Church teaches that it is a moral truth ac-
cessible to unaided reason. POPE PAUL VI, Humanae Vitae, in 5 THE PAPAL ENCYCLICALS, 
1958-1981, at 223-24 (Claudia Carlen Ihm ed., 1981). 
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tal rights, or forbidding homosexuals to practice medicine, or forbid-
ding abortion even when necessary to spare a woman from a crippling 
or debilitating illness, or requiring the tattooing of people who carry 
the AIDS virus, or - coming closest to Griswold itself - requiring· 
married couples to have a minimum number of children unless they 
prove that they are infertile. [p. 194] 
Is this a laundry list of things Posner just happens to dislike, with 
no internal relation save the existential one of being Posner's "can't 
helps"? Posner might be asserting that there is a common intelligi-
ble feature in all these "embarrassments." What is it? Is it not a 
common moral defect? Whatever it is, it serves as a premise from 
which each of the negative conclusions can be drawn. If so, then 
Griswold is not just a "can't help" case. 
Posner's professed aim is to embed his economic reasoning in a 
world populated by lots of fixed moral points. Why not take the 
direct route? Why not connect to "our intuitions" through a philo-
sophical or practical commitment to democracy as, simply, popular 
decisionmaking? 
Posner is deeply reserved in his commitment to democracy, if he 
is not actually antidemocratic. Democracy disperses power and 
thus enables "people to enforce their dislike of other people's self-
regarding behavior" (p. 25). In "its practical operation ignorance is 
pervasive, selfishness is salient, and at times a disinterested malevo-
lence is at work" (p. 26). Our representatives are little better than 
the people they represent. "Our statute books overflow with vi-
cious, exploitive, inane, ineffectual, and extravagantly costly laws" 
- and there would be more if our "democracy were more populist" 
than it is (p. 26). To show that the vox populi is an uncertain guide, 
Posner even invites the reader to imagine some Hitler-style dema-
gogue leading us to do away with civil liberties (p. 219). 
Posner says that liberals, like him, want to limit the scope of 
democracy through separation of powers and judicial review. Since 
the latter is the nonpopulist element, it must be the deep solution to 
the problems of democracy. Now we have come face-to-face with 
law, particularly constitutional review by courts. It is time to ex-
amine, explicitly and in detail, the role of economics in Posner's 
theory of law. 
V. LEGAL THEORISTS AND LEGAL THEORY 
Nothing in what I have said or will have to say about Posner 
casts any doubt on the truth that economics provides an invaluable 
service to the legal enterprise by identifying likely consequences -
costs and benefits - of proposed courses of action. Posner's com-
ment on rent control laws nicely exemplifies the value of this 
service: 
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The beneficiaries are plain to see: they are the tenants when the rent-
control law is adopted. The victims are invisible: they are the future 
would-be tenants, who will face a restricted supply of rental housing 
because landowners will have a diminished incentive to build rental 
housing and owners of existing apartment buildings will prefer to sell 
rather than rent the apartments in them. Economics brings these vic-
tims before the analyst's eye, literature, and the type of legal scholar-
ship that imitates literature, does not.28 
Posner's recurring criticism of academic legal reformers, and it is 
generally sound, is not that when they recommend adopting, say, 
rent control laws they make a mistake in calibrating its costs and 
benefits. It is, rather, that they simply ignore the consequences of 
the measures they recommend. Of Drucilla Cornell's Hegelian pro-
posal to outlaw employment at will, Posner says that although it is 
"not . . . demonstrably wrong . . . it is irresponsible, because if 
adopted it might very well impose immense social costs - and 
costs born mainly by workers themselves, the intended beneficiaries 
of the proposal - that she has not [even] considered" (p. 311). So, 
John Hart Ely has a "weak sense of fact" (p. 205); the "essential 
facts" concerning the subject of Martha Minow's book "are miss-
ing" (p. 295); Patricia Williams is "careless about facts" (p. 377), 
"blur[s] the line between fiction and truth" (p. 375), and her feel-
ings on race, like Catharine MacKinnon's on pornography, have 
"far outrun the facts" (p. 367); Rorty has a "deficient sense of fact" 
(p. 444). 
Posner makes a related criticism of academic lawyers - that 
they do not possess the social scientific expertise that their subject 
matter requires. Thus, Morton Horwitz's psychologizing is "irre-
sponsibly amateur" (p. 283); "[c]onstitutional lawyers know little 
about their proper subject matter - a complex of political, social, 
and economic phenomena. They know only cases" (p. 208); Minow 
is not the expert she needs to be in labor and finance markets 
(p. 294). 
The more politically left of these writers - notably Williams, 
MacKinnon, Horwitz, and Rorty - come under Posner's indict-
ment for Utopianism. They would reform a world they know noth-
ing about. They seem to think that the world is infinitely malleable, 
just so much flexible clay to be molded per the theorists' creative 
design. This is, for Posner, the post-modernist corruption of prag-
matism. He rightly scorns it. 
Posner is right that many policy proposals stand or fall on their 
probable consequences. The right answer to many questions de-
28. P. 381 (footnote omitted). Posner thinks it a "good thing" that places like Santa 
Monica and New York City have rent control - "not for the people of those cities but for the 
rest of us, who can judge from these national experiments whether rent control has the ef-
fects that economists predict or those the Left predicts." Pp. 107-08. 
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pends upon what, in reality, works. But that is no concession to the 
emerging thesis of OL. The criticism of economics in law is not that 
economic analysis is fanciful, unbelievable, or useless. It is very 
useful. The criticism is, as Posner seemed to be saying in the Intro-
duction, that economics is radically incomplete, and dangerous 
without an enveloping, regulating morality and metaphysics. 
But Posner's main target in OL is ... philosophy! - broadly 
construed to include all metaphysics and ethics, particularly the al-
legedly "Catholic" contention that there is an objective, categorical, 
and universal morality that can be known to be true. A very inter-
esting thing about Posner's chapters criticizing legal writers is that 
almost none defends or presupposes "philosophy" in this· sense. 
They do not traffic in Truth - with a capital T - or metaphysics. 
Bork is no metaphysician. He is almost as hostile to judicial philos-
ophizing as Posner is. Ackerman is a genuine liberal, as Posner 
would seem to be. Ely is a process theorist, as were Henry Hart 
and Herbert Wechsler. Dworkin, whose work is deeply philosophi-
cal and concerned with legitimacy, is no genuine natural lawyer. 
These writers are basically deep conventionalists when it comes to 
morals. They take their bearings from the conscience and traditions 
of the American people - our time-tested "can't helps." What 
does Posner find so deeply objectionable in their work? 
They all believe in some nonnegligible autonomy of law. Posner 
indicts them for believing that the Constitution is an "algorithm for 
deciding all cases" (p. 77); that law can be so "impersonal that the 
values, personal experience, and social and political opinions of the 
judge do not affect judicial outcomes" (pp. 20-21); that judging is a 
"logical manipulation of principles" (p. 405); that judges achieve 
"demonstrably correct'' results on a routine basis (p. 20). 
Now, I have never encountered any writer, including those criti-
cized by Posner, who held these views. Law is not mathematics or 
geometry. No academic writer of my acquaintance has ever pro-
posed that law be made, even by judges, oblivious to consequences. 
Law and legal reasoning are, many have held, distinctive, 
nonarithmetic somethings. Many writers, including those in this 
wing of Posner's gallery, consider legal reasoning to be a restricted, 
integrated analysis that :filters a judge's personal convictions about 
correct or sound public policy. 
Nevertheless, Posner sharply denies the "autonomy of law" -
the supposition that law possesses an "internal logic" and that it is 
independent of contiguous social scientific disciplines. "Economic 
analysis of law almost by definition denies law's autonomy" (p. 18). 
If there is no such thing as "legal reasoning," what is Posner's idea 
of "legal theory"? Posner has cast aside the whole moral philo-
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sophical approach to law, and with it, much contemporary jurispru-
dence. Again, what is his "legal theory"? 
Posner's legal theory is professedly part pragmatism, part liber-
alism, and part economics. We now fear that this compound distills 
down to economics. We are wondering what stands between eco-
nomics and the whole of our social world, at least that very consid-
erable part of it governed by law. Does law, if not legal reasoning, 
serve as a barrier? Does theory? Does "legal theory"? 
What is law? Posner is not entirely skeptical about law's deter-
minacy. He allows that when a statute or judicial precedent plainly 
governs a case the judge should apply it. Posner agrees that judges 
make law sometimes, in the law's open areas, but he does not doubt 
that, once decided, the instant case is recognized as law because of 
its source, its judicial pedigree. Posner does not, for example, say 
that a law that is economically perverse is no law at all. 
Posner presupposes most of what "positivism" is classically un-
derstood to be about. Positivism is basically the effort, initiated by 
Bentham and Austin, to develop the conceptual tools necessary to 
do a sort of legal anthropology. What, descriptively, is treated as 
law in a given community? To answer this question, positivists 
would count the revealed Word of God as law if that is what the 
society being studied adhered to. Posner assumes something like a 
sources thesis for identifying what counts as law. But all this is im-
plicit. It is not what he has in mind when he talks about "legal 
theory." 
Posner has some notion of intrasystemic authority: the "judicial 
game," according to Posner, includes "at least a qualified adherence 
to rules laid down in legislation and in previous cases" (p. 21). This 
game, he cautions, can be justified in pragmatic and economic 
terms, even if not conducted entirely as a pragmatic, economic ex-
ercise. Posner says that the judge should not articulate "substan-
tively rational" - i.e., economically sensible - rules "whenever" 
he thinks the received law is not rational. This is "[s]omething, but 
perhaps not much" (p. 21) of a Dworkinian element in an institu-
tion - the law - that is "justified" by economic and pragmatic 
values. 
Law is, for Posner, not methodology. Law is a "subject" 
(p. 324). But what is the "subject"? Is it just so many propositions 
of law, disconnected points of light on the legal landscape? What 
could a theory of them be? 
It appears that, for Posner, some propositions contained in law 
will stand fast against economics, at least until legislators begin to 
behave "rationally" - i.e., economically. But how many depends 
upon a judge's way of interpreting language, for Posner recom-
mends economic reasoning in the law's open areas. How transpar-
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ent will the Posnerian judge take language to be, especially in the 
superintending - superior to statute - realm of constitutional 
interpretation? 
Posner rejects all the theories of constitutional interpretation 
that he considers. He declares against both "top down" and "bot-
tom up" theories (pp. 172-75). He rejects outright the possibility of 
a "middle way" between "judicial activism" and "strict construc-
tionism" in constitutional interpretation (p. 199). Posner seems to 
believe that if there is no reliable "technique" for interpreting the 
Constitution - like "cryptography, or translation, or reading a 
chest X-ray for signs of pulmon?ry disease" - there is little more 
to "constitutional 'interpretation' " than the "reading of palms" and 
the "interpretation of dreams" (p. 199). There surely is no such 
"technique." So, Posner thinks his "instinctual" method of inter-
pretation is as well-grounded as any other. 
Posner expressly compares the problem of constitutional inter-
pretation to that of interp~eting a work of music, suggesting once 
again that there is no distinctly legal point of view. A capsule criti-
cism of Bork's work: "[O]riginalism is neither the inevitable nor 
even the natural method of interpreting a given body of texts, or 
even the method of interpretation that is natural or inevitable for 
conservatives to follow" (p. 240). Except that the question con-
cerns only a theory of constitutional interpretation, not a general 
theory of textual interpretation, and the criteria of aptness need not 
be naturalness or inevitability. 
Posner sums up his views on interpretation as follows: 
One cannot choose among ... interpretations on semantic or concep-
tual grounds. Choice must be based on which interpretation seems 
best in a sense that includes but also transcends considerations of fi-
delity to a text and a tradition. The interpretive question is ultimately 
a political, economic, or social one to which social science may have 
more to contribute than law. [p. 207] 
Law, on this flexible view of interpreting it, would be pretty perme-
able to "social science." 
What is "theory"? Facts are necessary but insufficient to intelli-
gently answer the questions that law faces. As Posner says, "[a] 
taste for fact . . . will tum to gall if unaccompanied by a taste for 
theory" (p. 427). Facts alone do not constitute genuine knowledge. 
Facts remain undetected among an undifferentiated mass of phe-
nomena in the absence of a "theory." Theory guides the search for 
"significant" facts (p. 427). The type of theory Posner has in mind, 
he often says, is a non-normative or positive theory - economics is 
a prime example - that lights up the important features of the fea-
tureless - nontheoretically considered - landscape. We want the-
ory, says Posner, "not to describe the phenomena being 
investigated but to add to our useful knowledge" (p. 430). 
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Posner cautions, however, that we must be "pragmatic about 
theory" (p. 431). "It is a tool rather than a glimpse of ultimate 
truth, and the criteria of a good tool is its utility" (p. 431). What 
distinguishes the useful theory? The "purpose of theory," he says, 
is to "add to our useful knowledge, mainly of causal relations" (p. 
430). Posner's "overall theoretical stance," then, stresses "facts" 
that are organized "theoretically" into "social sciences" and radi-
cally depreciates the role of evaluative criteria. 
What, finally, can "legal theory" be? Posner says that as subject, 
not method, law is amenable to study by people in other disciplines, 
like economics and political science (p. 324). His "legal theory" is 
an "effective instrument for understanding and improving law, and 
social institutions generally" (p. viii). What's this? Nonlawyers do-
ing "legal theory"? Legal theorists lighting up "social institutions 
generally"? Perhaps the best summary of what Posner thinks is 
necessary to do "legal theory" is this: "a taste for fact, a respect for 
social science, an eclectic curiosity, a desire to be practical, a belief 
in individualism, and an openness to new perspectives" (p. viii). 
There is nothing distinctly "legal" about this list. Anyone might be 
a Posnerian legal theorist. 
The subject matter of OL - "legal theory" - is fast disappear-
ing from view. Apart from undeniably clear legal enactments, it has 
disappeared into economics. 
VI. POSNER'S "LEGAL THEORY" 
Let us examine a featured constructive proposal in 0 L - stated 
in a chapter entitled "What do Judges Maximize?" - and Posner's 
general conception of the Rule of Law. Does Posner's "legal the-
ory" explain them or transform them? 
A. Free Will and the Rule of Law 
Posner is frank in OL about the basic point of criminal law, and 
it is through the criminal law, as Posner understands it, that we can 
appreciate Posner's brief comments on the "rule of law" itself (p. 
20). Criminal law does not aim to "punish" the "guilty" and to pro-
tect the "innocent." Those are my scare quotes, though they might 
as well be Posner's. For my - and, I suspect, the reader's - ac-
count of criminal law traffics in what Posner calls "imaginary enti-
ties" like "mind," "intent," and "free will."29 Criminal law treats 
people as agents who are morally responsible for their bad acts. 
29. Posner's casualness in handling metaphysical concepts is most evident concerning free 
choice. He refers to the idea of free will - one of the law's "so-called metaphysical bal-
loons" - more than once in OL. See pp. 397, 398, 445, 462. Posner's insouciance is consis· 
tent with what most likely is his view that free will is not real, even if muddled talk about it 
will not stop. 
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Posner rejects this moralistic approach root and branch. The "prin-
cipal social concern behind criminal punishment is a concern with 
dangerousness rather than with mental states" (p. 397). The aim is 
to leave "harmless" - not "innocent" (a moral category) - people 
alone (p. 27). What prompts this view? 
We can easily dispose . of one Posnerian apology for treating 
criminals as dangerous objects rather than as autonomous agents. 
He says that juries do not peek into the defendant's mind to see 
what this object "intended" (p. 397). Yet, juries routinely and relia-
bly infer from certain probative evidence what a person chose to 
do. Posner does not consider the common case of trial on evidence 
including a defendant's confession to the police, or statement to 
some nonpolice personnel, to the effect: "I really wanted to kill 
that s.o.b., and I did." 
It is reasonably clear that Posner just does not believe in "free 
choice" or "intention" at all.30 He is convinced that though we can-
not now predict with great success what people will do, some day 
we shall very likely be able to so predict. It is "cause and effect" all 
the way down.31 
Posner finds utility in retaining traditional moral language. It is 
now not so much that jurors cannot understand what a criminal was 
doing, but that it is somehow better that jurors not try to: 
The connected concepts of intention and free will, applied for exam-
ple in the setting of criminal punishment, support the idea that people 
are different from other dangerous things, from rattlesnakes for ex-
ample. . . . Thus, although free will and intention have little if any 
place in the science game, they may have a place in the judicial game. 
[p. 398] If we understand a criminal behavior, we are unlikely to ac-
cord him much dignity and respect. [p. 382] 
Posner's criminal law is a "utility-maximizing instrument of so-
cial control" (p. 270), similar not to our criminal justice system but 
to our practice whereby noncriminally dangerous people are de-
tained to protect others - what might be called the "social hygiene 
game," the public health "quarantine game," or the "zoo game." 
30. See pp. 382, 397-98; POJ, supra note 11, at 166-67. Posner opposes getting inside the 
defendant's mind to see what he chose to bring about to the capacity for judgment: "When 
we succeed in looking at the world through another's eyes, we lose the perspective necessary 
for judgment. We find ourselves in a stew of rationalization, warped perception, and over-
mastering emotion." P. 381. According to Posner, "the internal perspective - the putting 
oneself in the other person's shoes - that is achieved by the exercise of empathetic imagina-
tion lacks nonnative significance." P. 381. Here is another example of Posner's unpredict-
able use of "nonnative." See supra note 8. 
31. A telling manifestation of this faith is Posner's inability to distinguish regularities in 
the conduct of an upright, well-integrated person - what some call "character" - from the 
compulsions of an addict and the instinct of a sparrow. See POJ, supra note 11, at 173-74. In 
OL, Posner states at one point: "To understand another person completely is .•. to under-
stand the person as completely as a scientist understands an animal, which is to say as a 
phenomenon of nature rather than as a free agent." P. 382. 
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The same society "plays" all these "games" and also the "judicial 
game." How would Posner explain that? How is it that, if people 
are "cause and effect" all the way down, we make these distinctions, 
so that restraint is criminal punishment here, civil commitment 
there, etc.? Why then do we sustain a judicial game in which imagi-
nary entities like free choice and guilt "support the idea" that peo-
ple are not rattlesnakes? Has not Posner implied that people are 
just misunderstood rattlesnakes? 
Posner has not made any progress in his effort to explain, if not 
justify, our "intuitions" against gruesome punishments and torture. 
In the "utility-maximizing social control" game that he substitutes 
for our system of criminal justice, such practices would have their 
proper place. Posner can redescribe some of the raw behavioral 
substance of criminal justice in economic terms, but not very much 
of it, and the redescription ultimately fails. Posner simply is not 
talking about our criminal justice system at all. 
Posner says that "a major goal" of OL "is to nudge the judicial 
game a little closer to the science game" (p. 8). It is no comfort, 
then, that Posner considers the entire "rule of law" to be "a system 
of social control" (p. 20). The rule of law, for him, is valuable be-
cause it is a system of social control operated "in accordance with 
norms of disinterestedness and predictability" (p. 20) - a phrase 
that aptly describes the scientist's management of laboratory 
animals. 
B. The "Judicial Game" 
Posner asks, "What Do Judges Maximize?" and devotes the 
thirty-five pages of Chapter Three to answering the question. The 
question initially posed is about "a theory" of the "behavior" of the 
" 'ordinary' appellate judge" (p. 109). This focus away from the 
"extraordinary" "judicial titan" to the ordinary judge "exemplifies 
the pragmatist's interest in the world of fact, for most judges are, in 
fact, ordinary" (p. 109). Posner adds the qualifying claim that as 
"ordinary" folks, his subjects are not "truth-seeking," a proposition 
for which he cites another writer's assertion that "most judges" 
have been "plucked" from a deserved "intellectual obscurity."32 
But even intellectually obscure people can and do seek truth. They 
often have little trouble finding certain truths, like the truths that 
slavery is wrong and that it is wrong to punish the innocent. 
The ordinary federal judge's relative insulation from ordinary 
self-interest makes them interesting puzzles to Posner. No matter 
what they do - short of high crimes or misdemeanors - they 
32. P. 110 n.3 (quoting Charles W. Collier, The Use and Abuse of Humanistic Theory in 
Law: Reexamining the Assumptions of Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship, 41 DUKE LJ. 191, 
221 (1991)). 
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make the same money, and generally enjoy much the same power, 
prestige, and perks. What makes their behavior such a challenge to 
economic analysis of law, then, is that the quality and quantity of 
the work they do is not instrumental to what ordinarily counts as an 
incentive, as a benefit worth expending the resources of time and 
energy for. The question is, why do they do much work at all?33 
This is a challenge not only to "economic analysis of law" but, 
Posner says, "more broadly to the universalist claims of the eco-
nomic theory of human behavior" (p. 112). 
Posner implicitly eliminates the possibility that even "ordinary" 
judges find their work intrinsically worthwhile, that the work is its 
own reason for doing it, in the sense that knowledge and excellence 
in work are intelligibly worthwhile just in themselves. For allowing 
that there are such basically valuable things - just in themselves 
and not as means to some further end - would force Posner out of 
his entirely instrumental, technical conception of rationality. 
Posner stipulates out of the model a "desire to promote the public 
interest" (p. 118). Why? It would be inconsistent with "treating 
judges as 'ordinary' people."34 
Posner finds the most promising avenue of explaining judges' 
behavior in analogies to voting in elections. The "consumption 
value" of voting depends on making "a deliberate choice of whom 
to vote for" (p. 123). Posner realizes that this explains at most that 
judges cast a vote. Why do they "vote for one side rather than an-
other, or to vote for one interpretation of a statute or legal doctrine 
rather than another, or to adopt one judicial philosophy ... rather 
than another?" (p. 126). Posner has yet to explain why federal 
judges work hard rather than play golf in Scottsdale. They could 
golf in Scottsdale - a lot - and get all the "consumption value" 
advanced so far by voting in cases. Voting is not what consumes 
them. What takes so much time, Posner must realize, is the crafting 
of opinions to justify and to explain votes. 
We seem to have moved on, in any event, to a different ques-
tion, a question something like: Why does Judge X become a strict 
constructionist? Posner rules out the possibility that Judge X comes 
to "strict constructionism" because it is true, valid, or sound, either 
philosophically or based upon a controlling enactment - like the 
Constitution (p. 127). Posner finds the analogue of his choice: "the 
choices we make watching dramatic or cinematic performances" (p. 
127). 
33. "Most" federal appellate judges work "quite hard - often at an age when their coun-
terparts in private practice have retired and are living in Scottsdale or La Jolla . . . . Their 
utility function must in short contain something besides leisure and the judicial salary." P. 
117. 
34. P. 118. Posner says that views on the public interest "affect" judicial preferences "but 
only insofar as decisions expressing those views enhance the judge's utility." P. 118. 
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The judge brings to bear on his spectatorial function not only a range 
of personal and political preferences but also a specialized cultural 
competence - his knowledge of and experience in "the law." And if 
he is an appellate judge he will consult with his professional col-
leagues before making up his mind. 
Of course few legal cases have the rich ambiguities of Hamlet. 
Many cases involve puzzles soluble with the technical tools of legal 
analysis - here the judge is like the reader of a detective story. The 
jury as factfinder performs a similar function. It is a different kind of 
spectatorship from the one I am stressing here, that of the appellate 
judge asked to decide not where truth lies but which party has the 
better case. But in either case the choice, like that of the theater audi-
ence, is a disinterested one; the judge's or jury's income is not affected 
by it. A further point is that the less informed the tribunal is, the 
more "dramatic" the trial must be to hold the "audience's" attention. 
It is not surprising that Anglo-American trials, historically dominated 
by juries, are more dramatic than Continental trials, historically domi-
nated by professional judges. [p. 128] 
Are we now trying to explain the judge's or jury's decision at 
trial? Posner does not explicitly shift the focus. Even so, we have 
not progressed in our search for the cause of judicial diligence: they 
can take a particular view of Hamlet without producing the lengthy 
opinions that take so much of their time. 
So why do judges write lengthy opinions? According to Posner, 
they do so in order to maximize the "pleasure of judging" (p. 131). 
Posner then addresses an obvious objection to his explanation of 
judges as maximizers of such psychic satisfaction. Why do judges 
act so, well, judicial? Why not sock it to the irritating litigant or the 
irksome colleague, and affirm racial, class, or gender solidarity? 
Why, in other words, if judges maxiiµize "pleasure" do they engage 
in what would appear to be so much self-denial? 
The pleasure of judging is bound up with compliance with certain self-
limiting rules that define the "game" of judging. It is a source of satis-
faction to a judge to vote for the irritating litigant, for the lawyer who 
fails to exhibit proper deference to the court, for the side that repre-
sents a different social class from that of the judges. It is by doing 
such things that you know you are playing the judge role, not some 
other role; and judges for the most part are people who want to be -
judges. [p. 131] 
This is hard to fathom. It is like saying that everyone seeks plea-
sure, but that some people - let us call them "stoics" - get plea-
sure by denying themselves pleasure. 
The claim is more peculiar still. The judicial game's "raw mater-
ials" are "the ugly realities of life": "hatred, disease, crime, be-
trayal, war, poverty, bereavement, despair" (pp. 133-34). The 
pleasure-seeking judge seeks out this world. The "judicial game" 
- which transmutes these ugly things into intellectual problems of 
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rights and duties - "comfort[s]" judges by insulating them from, in 
Posner's example, thinking themselves killers when they uphold the 
death penalty (pp. 133-34). 
Posner recognizes that no ordinary person would seek pleasure 
by seeking out repugnant things and then scrambling to shield one-
self from them once found. Why bother in the first place? Posner 
says that self-selection and the careful screening "of judicial candi-
dates" assure that most lawyers who become judges will, neverthe-
less, be people who do. On this view, we surely should wish for an 
explanation of these features of the judicial task - features com-
monly called the "rule of law" - and not of the pleasure curve of 
judges who might want to play by that rule. The more traditional 
- and accurate - view of judging supposes precisely that these 
distinctive features are there to assure, as much as possible, that 
despite the normal human biases, proclivities, and frailties of the 
judges - their "utility curve" if you like - litigants get roughly 
equal justice. 
Posner does not suggest that anyone would have created a judi-
cial system in order to satisfy this highly unusual pleasure curve. 
He does not quite ask us to believe that the U.S. Supreme Court 
was created, and is sustained by, a commitment to judges' pleasure. 
Besides, Posner says that "many cases" cannot be decided by refer-
ence to extant, conventional legal materials (p. 131). I suppose 
many can. On Posner's view, they present no opportunity for 
choice at all - either for or against Hamlet. Why do judges do any 
work on these cases? Finally, Posner "doubt[s] that any judge sub-
jectively experiences his job" in the way he models it in the chapter. 
He confesses: "I don't" (p. 110 n.4). 
CONCLUSION 
What is left standing in "legal theory" between the economic 
juggernaut and the awful consequences Posner sketched in his In-
troduction? Moral philosophy has been swept aside, along with 
legal reasoning, the fruits of their inquiries strewn about like so 
many derelict facts. Economics has taken their measure, assimilat-
ing them under collaborating descriptions like "mental externality." 
Posner says that even "if there are no deep, metaphysical reali-
ties of the sort that religious and philosophical thinkers" have long 
believed in, we are not facing the abyss (p. 457). "There are," he 
explains, "mid-level social scientific theories and empirical method-
ologies whose utility is not undermined" by metaphysics' demise 
(pp. 457-58). Yes, but if all there is are highly organized informa-
tion and technical operations performable upon it - engineering, 
psychology, military science, and the like - who or what will do the 
necessary work of integration? 
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Posner does not bring this precise question to the surface. But 
economics - the "instrumental" science par excellence, queen of 
the social sciences - is, when 0 L has run its course, the only an-
swer that Posner can possibly offer. 
